Kant and Anthropology `FREE`

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Summary

Actual, possible, and potential relations between Kant and anthropology in early-21st-century scholarship are worth exploring. Within the realm of actual relations, classical figures within anthropology took up Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason* to understand the nature of thinking and morality within so-called primitive societies. They sought to put society before mind within Kant's architectonic of thought and to posit classification, or relational thinking, as equally important as cognition. Within possible relations, contemporary anthropologists engaged Kant's anthropology or Kant as a possible anthropologist in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* or "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" or set apart their enterprise of studying ethics from his on morality. A very central question that Kant's writings posed for them was whether the figure of the human was knowable, to which anthropology added its own nuance by asking whether we can assume it is the same human or reason across all contexts. Within potential relations, writings on the history and method of anthropology both critiqued and celebrated the inheritance of German romanticism, understood as an intellectual trend, a methodology, a sensibility, a mystical orientation, and a celebration of individual singularity and genius within anthropology. In contrast to this mode of inheriting romanticism, a more Kantian-inflected understanding of the romantic movement, mediated by different figures, suggested itself as a productive point of entry for anthropology to understand the philosophical underpinnings of its preferred methods (e.g., fieldwork), its engagement with philosophy beyond that of agonism and possible arrogation, and its re-engagement with the question of the human in relation to itself, other humans and nonhumans, and nature. The fragment, one of romanticism's greatest creations and a complex response to Kant's two world metaphysics, appears to anthropology through both trajectories and, in keeping with anthropology's evolving relation to philosophy, anthropology provides its own spin on the importance of the fragment for inhabiting the world.

Keywords: Kant, Durkheim, Mauss, Levi-Strauss, thinking, Foucault, ethics, Novalis, Schelling, romanticism

Kant's Copernican Revolution

Social and cultural anthropology has regularly cast Immanuel Kant, the 18th-century German philosopher, as a key antagonist, justly critiquing his work for the universalist account of reason, for his role in the promotion of European standards of what counts as acceptable

knowledge, and for the colonial legacy of the Enlightenment. At the same time, Kant is also vaguely claimed to be an anthropological ancestor, a forerunner of efforts to make "the human" the subject of scientific inquiry, for example, through the influence of Enlightenment thinking on Franz Boas (Stocking 1982, 1989). Therefore, the criticisms of Kant are part and parcel of larger efforts to be more reflexive and critical about modern anthropology's colonial history. As anthropology has developed into an empirical field science, it has tried to distance itself from this limited humanism, by testifying to diverse and contested ways of being human. Initially, this took the form of providing evidence for the rationality of non-Western cultures, moving toward arguing for multiple rationalities. It has increasingly meant troubling the elevation of reason above other faculties of the mind or knowledge of the body. Within this broad context, what precisely is the historical and intellectual relation between Kant and anthropology?

Though Kant famously taught a popular lecture course on "Anthropologie," John H. Zammito (2002) makes the important observation that the substance of his lectures could not differ more from the substance of modern anthropology. While anthropology has been insistent on the importance of culture and society for human existence, Kant's own focus was on the mind or self-consciousness, which he viewed as uniquely human. In particular, Kant made "the theory of action and the self-consciousness of choice" his objects of inquiry within his course and the book based on it titled *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Zammito 2002, 297).

While Kant's philosophical anthropology and cultural and social anthropology developed along different trajectories (Vermeulen 2015), it would be hard to overstate the considerable influence Kant has exerted on the humanities more generally, and one finds his influence carried into early-21st-century anthropological theory both explicitly and implicitly. Kant reoriented philosophy in the late 18th century by making all philosophical inquiry earthbound; that is, such knowledge was the product of experience alone (Förster 2012). However, he wasn't only binding knowledge to actual, observable experience upon which to reflect, as in the case of Humean empiricism, but was also linking knowledge to experience in its idealist dimension, that is as anticipated and constructed by the faculties of the mind. This made humans travelers and seekers of experience within the imagination, but always within the limits of possible experience. His was, as he called it, a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, the effects of which rippled through the humanities and entered into anthropology through mediating figures such as Émile Durkheim and Michel Foucault.

Despite Kant's acknowledged importance as a forerunner of anthropology and his subsequent direct and mediated influence upon social and cultural anthropology, there are few systematic efforts to examine the different ways he has been received. Although not an exhaustive survey, this article explores how anthropologists have engaged Kant through central themes that constitute his three critiques (*Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*) and cognate works. More specifically, it shows how anthropologists attempted to (a) socialize the transcendental figure of the thinking subject, (b) take on board the question of the human, (c) pluralize reason, (d) posit ethics rather than morals as the subject of anthropological study, and (e) engage the romanticism latent in Kant's writings. These engagements have helped anthropology clarify its central concepts and political commitments, making Kant part of its deep structure, even if not so appreciated. However, more often than not, anthropologists take his works, or more specifically an element of it, as their point of departure rather than offer a close reading of Kant. Consequently, I have felt it

necessary to intermittently provide a sketch of Kant's various and evolving projects to show how a return to Kant within anthropology addresses his guiding questions but towards different ends.

Socializing the Transcendental Subject, and Classification pace Cognition

It is almost de rigueur for contemporary anthropological writings to begin with putting distance between themselves and the Enlightenment. And there is none as excoriated as Kant for entrenching reason in its position of power reigning over other faculties of the mind. So it is with some surprise that one reads in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* that his project is to constrain the overreach of reason, such that it cannot make claims to knowledge of objects of which it does not have experience. The classical examples of such objects are metaphysical beings, notably God and the soul. This reigning in of reason is seen as Kant protecting the divine and rescuing faith from the skepticism that haunts reason (Beiser 2002; Förster 2012). But its restraint also spells the strengthening of sensibility, that is, intuitions, sensations, and perceptions as the means by which one encounters objects in the world, the flourishing of the imagination in bringing sensibility closer to such objects, and the importance of judgment in constituting meaningful experience and stitching one's self with the knowledge and experience of objects. In other words, even as the world in itself is consigned out of reach by thinking, its there-ness, its orientation toward us, its constant provocation to the senses, makes it as necessary for thinking as the architectonic of thought outlined in the first critique.

This coupling of the world, always out of reach but nonetheless there, and thinking is the foundation of Kant's transcendental idealism. It is distinct from pure idealism that consigns everything to mental representations, and from pure realism that consigns everything to actualities and realities of which we only have shadows in our mind. The struggle of transcendental idealism is to give presence to this world, without knowing it in itself, and to recognize the substantiality, even universality of its representation within our thinking and experience. The philosopher Stanley Cavell provides a poetical rendition of the human condition produced by such philosophy, in which humans are relegated to being next to, but always separate from, the world. It is a world that they cannot deny by retreat into solipsism, and which leads humans to attempt to constantly transcend their limits in the efforts to access it. Thus, he claims the human condition to be one of restlessness (Cavell 2004).

Early figures foundational to anthropology, notably Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, were very engaged with Kant's critical philosophy. The introduction and conclusion of Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (2008) most explicitly address themselves to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in which Kant delineated the categories of understanding by which knowledge and experience were synthesized from sense perceptions. Positing a difference between those who claim that categories of understanding are prior to empirical experience and are innate to the human mind, and those who claim that such categories are constituted by the individual from such experience, Durkheim aims to reconcile the apriorists as he calls the first group and the empiricists, the second. He says of the first: "The apriorists are rationalists; they believe the world has a logical aspect that reason eminently expresses. To do this, however, they must attribute to the mind a certain power of transcending experience and adding to what is immediately given . . ." (2008, 16). However, he is quick to add, "they

neither explain nor justify this singular power" (2008, 16). His argument, which he puts forward in the introduction and parses with more care in the conclusion, is that these categories are the products of the rich intellectual and empirical activity of a collective, past and present, which is more than the sum of its parts.

Durkheim seems aware that in socializing the transcendental figure of the thinking subject in Kant he may be perceived as making the categories a little too earthy, wrenching them from the heights of the understanding to the elementary habits, practices, and thinking of individuals, or making them too societally particular. However, he is quick to assert that the categories have "objective value," that is, they are the same across societies albeit inflected differently depending on the specificity of the prevailing collective thought and representations (which he also calls "concepts" in his conclusion) and ritual practices. The reason for this is that society is within nature and as such bound by the same logical structure prevalent in the natural world: "The fundamental relations that exist between things—which these categories are designed to express—should be essentially similar in different realms" (2008, 20).

In his conclusion to *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim makes a stronger argument for how the categories are necessarily social. They are social because they express the social. They express an order of reality of the social, such as a class or a genus that surpasses individual experience and concepts. They tend toward a view of the whole, to a conception of totality. And they need the social to be actualized in individual lives. In a final engagement with Kant, Durkheim says that the philosopher must have prescribed to the idea of a unified whole because Kant saw pure, speculative reason and practical reason as two sides of the same faculty. He understands Kant to mean: "to think rationally is to think according to laws that are everywhere obvious to all reasonable beings" (2008, 341). And ends with what almost sounds like a slogan for modern anthropology: "A society is the most powerful bundle of physical and moral forces observable in nature" (2008, 342) but one that privileges thought, albeit collective thought, over practice alone. Thus the task that Durkheim sets himself in the text is to constitute the basis of a new science, that is, to elicit these collective, objective categories, such as "notions of time, space, genus, number, cause, substance, personality, and so on" (2008, 11), in their societal specificity.

While countless works spanning the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, and religious studies engage Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, three works are noteworthy for emphasizing the contribution of this text to philosophy and, through philosophy, to anthropology. In her 1996 article "Durkheim's Epistemology: The Neglected Argument," Anne Warfield Rawls claims that Durkheim's readers have long confused his contribution to epistemology with his sociology of knowledge. According to Rawls, Durkheim's major contribution to philosophy was to move away from apriorism, empiricism, and pragmatism, the three dominant models of philosophy in his time, to suggest how a limited set of categories of the understanding, the same across the board, are produced in and through socially specific practices and processes, beyond the mind, the individual, and the specific context as in the three models. This is different from his sociology of knowledge in which he attends to collective representations (or concepts), which Rawls says are in effect ideas, and their corresponding cosmologies by which societies understand and organize themselves. These are less universal and more societally specific. Finally, Rawls makes the ambitious claim that the entire structure of *The Elementary Forms* is set up to show how universal categories,

specifically force, causality, classification, emerge out of ritual practices. In other words, Durkheim marshals ethnographic data not just to substantiate a philosophical claim about categories of the understanding but rather to show how social life is an imbrication of the intellectual and the practical.

Bhrigupati Singh's *Poverty and the Quest for Life: Spiritual and Material Striving in Rural India* (2015) deals with Durkheim only in passing and in a more critical fashion than we find in Rawl's efforts. However, there is resonance between Durkheim's understanding of collective representations or concepts and Singh's commitment to concept creation within anthropology. This resonance is worth remarking on as a way to show how a Kantian-inflected Durkheim remains a capacious thinker for contemporary anthropologists despite his staid commitment to society as the only legitimating authority of collective thought and life. While Singh bemoans this commitment, he appreciates Durkheim's attention to the aspect of the impersonal force that animates religious life and to the different forms of beings, including gods, spirits, and animals, that constitute this life, and capture and express this force. The social emerges not as already known but still in need of exploration of its many known, forgotten, and future denizens and their potentialities. In a separate article "How Concepts Make the World Look Different: Affirmative and Negative Genealogies of Thought" (2014), Singh draws on the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to posit that anthropology is as involved in creating concepts as philosophy, that concepts bring newness into the world. While Durkheim makes concepts merely the object of anthropological study, nevertheless concepts are the means by which he understands immediacy, experience, flux, and change to enter into the social. As an aside, it is interesting to note a particular reflection from Kant. For Kant, force was the third of the categories (for him, forms of intuition) for which he sought a construction (the other two were time and space) (Kant [1786] 2004). While he understood it in a naturalistic sense, it is interesting to see how Durkheim, who draws on force from Kant, reads it in a more somatic sense, as collective effervescence, and that it appears as vitalist movement for Singh.

A Kantian-inflected Durkheim also features heavily within William Mazzarella's *The Mana of Mass Society* (2017), for it is Durkheim who both sets up society as social form *and* as vital energy for Mazzarella. While Singh prefers the Durkheim of vital energy, Mazzarella asks that we consider Durkheim as offering insight into our contemporary condition in which both progressive and reactionary forces run the gambit between eruptive emergence and consolidated structures. How has the movement between the two been conceived within the anthropological archives, and how might it be mobilized to understand our present to produce more effective analysis than that of moral posturing and evaluation? How might more contemporary cultural analysis, such as that of advertising, help us to understand age-old knotty questions within anthropology, or even perhaps philosophy? While Mazzarella mobilizes Durkheim to set up the problematic of his book, he returns again and again to Kant for perspectives on how we have come to be as we are today (shut off from the natural world, in quest of mastery over that world), in the process offering sympathetic glimpses of Kant so as to suggest that anthropology may not be forever antagonistic to this figure. He shows how Kant understood human reasoning not to be an enlightened state but a survival tactic to overcome our physical helplessness. Mazzarella is also sympathetic to the Kant of the third critique (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*) in which Kant speaks of aesthetic experience and reflective judgment, as opposed to the judgments of the understanding in the first critique. He reads Kant's insistence on our disinterested reaction to beauty within reflective judgment as

suggesting that Kant was aware that "we are resonantly, vitally porous to objects. On the other hand, *because* we are resonantly, vitally porous to objects we must constantly be on guard against the manipulation parties might make of our porosity" (Mazzarella 2017, 22, emphasis in the original). Kant serves Mazzarella well in his effort to show how the social is an ongoing activity and not as settled as is usually attributed to figures such as Durkheim.

Unsurprisingly, Marcel Mauss, Durkheim's nephew and intellectual successor, continues many of Durkheim's commitments. In his important study *A General Theory of Magic* (1972), he informs us that for magic to exist, society must be present. However, magic doesn't exist because people practice or experience it, but rather is presupposed by them. "Magic is believed and not perceived. It is a condition of the collective soul, a condition which is confirmed and verified by its results" (Mauss 1972, 119). Further, he writes: "It [magic] is present in an individual's consciousness purely as a result of the existence of society, in the same way as ideas of moral value and justice. We are confident that we are dealing with a category of collective thinking" (1972, 146). Two things are clear in terms of how Mauss is positioned with respect to Durkheim and Kant. One, he does not believe that magic is part of the cosmological, albeit contingent, order of ideas within a given society understood as collective representations by Durkheim in the conclusion of *The Elementary Forms*. Rather, magic is within the limited but intrinsic set of categories that provide the armature for thinking within society, such as space, time, and causality as sketched by Durkheim in his introduction. Second, although magic is said by Mauss to be among the categories of the understanding qua Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is closer to the maxims that comprise the moral law within *Critique of Practical Reason*. He goes on to say that magic is of the nature of Kant's a priori "synthetic judgments," in other words, people can have and construct experience and knowledge of magic apart from any actual experience of it. In so far as magic is in the deep structures of thinking, it may be testable by experiments, and doubts may be voiced if it repeatedly ends in failure; however, in reality it can never be disproven. It is, in a word, "universal" (1972, 120).

There is another word that Mauss uses for magic other than moral law, a priori synthetic judgment or universal, which is that of belief. This is an interesting choice because Kant would not claim that the categories of the understanding have the status of belief, which he would understand as a matter of religion and faith. Rather, the categories are given by nature to the mind and have to be in place to enable cognition of objects. But by claiming magic to be among these categories (elsewhere Mauss seems to imply that magic is only a kind of category enabling magical ideas just as categories enable human ideas [1972, 143–144]) and claiming magic to be belief, Mauss seems to imply that Kant presumes more than he can show, that his claims about categories are ungrounded articles of faith and that they may require closer attention to society than the workings of the mind for explanation.

This provocation of magic as belief and, by extension, all knowledge production as premised on belief is taken up by two contemporary anthropologists in different ways. To be a thing of belief is to be an object that is not knowable. As such, this object lurks at the periphery of one's attention, elusive to attention's gaze. However, its presence may be perceived. In *Naming the Witch* (2006), James Siegel explores the myriad ways in which magic is sensed without being apprehended, how its presence excites on account of its power, and how violence against those suspected of witchcraft is part of the unsuccessful and ongoing efforts to determine magic once and for all. In other words, the killing of people suspected to be

witches within a particular moment of political crisis is about ridding knowledge of any ambiguity and doubt. Siegel takes recourse to an aesthetic category made famous by Kant in his third critique in saying, "belief in witches can be seen as a form of the sublime" (2006, 23). In other words, when gazing upon magic and witchcraft, which cannot be fixed, much less looked upon, thought encounters a vastness, or power in Siegel's exposition that it cannot encompass and that throws it into a numbing fear at recognizing the limits of its ability to know. Through resort to the concept of the sublime, Siegel attempts to draw out the irrationalism and violence that accompanies Kantian modes of knowledge production, an unstated assumption within Mauss's *A General Theory of Magic*.

The early-21st-century translation of Charles de Brosses's long-forgotten classic *On the Worship of Fetish Gods: Or, A Parallel of the Ancient Religion of Egypt with the Present Religion of Nigritia* (Morris and Leonard 2017), written 250 years ago and that influenced Kant among other thinkers, is a reminder of precisely this strain of the irrationalism at the heart of rationalism. However, in the section on Kant titled "Re: Kant and the Good Fetishists among Us" in her lengthy essay "After de Brosses: Fetishism, Translation, Comparativism, Critique" accompanying the translation, Rosalind Morris says that the concept of the sublime does not begin to contain the fear of the limits of reason that haunted Kant (Morris 2017). The fear was that being limited to only represented objects, thought had no access to the things of which they were representations and could not grasp how things may access humans and not just by means of cognition. Thus, in Morris's reading, Kant's architectonic of thought left humans vulnerable to influence by things, the play of representations, abstract universals, or the purposiveness granted to nature in the third critique, all of which intimate the condition of fetishism, roughly understood as unregulated human-object interrelations. Morris writes: "We can therefore say that, within the Kantian system, or at least at the end of its elaboration, fetishism is the opposite of the sublime, for where the sublime throws the subject back onto herself in a consoling admiration for the power that allows her to have a concept of what cannot be known, thus holding open the gap between the knowing subject and the absolute that would otherwise enthrall her, fetishism closes it and holds out the lure of a possible traversal" (2017, 170). In both Mazzarella and Morris we see a different side of Kant, which is that of someone who was aware not only of the trespass of reason issuing from humans but also human receptivity to external forces that it could not know.

While Durkheim and Mauss were interested in socializing the transcendental Kantian subject, anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss was interested in excising the figure of the subject entirely. When philosopher Paul Ricoeur charged him with being a Kantian without a subject at a round table in 1962, he readily accepted the charge (Rossi 1973). Although like Durkheim he was concerned to elicit the categories that comprised thinking, for him these categories "refer[red] to 'given' laws and constraints of the mind, that is, to the unconscious system of the basic mechanisms of any mental activity" (1973, 32).

In *Tristes Tropiques* ([1955] 2012), we find Lévi-Strauss elaborating that such thinking is an activity in the world: "Knowledge is based neither on renunciation nor on barter; it consists rather in selecting *true* aspects, that is, those coinciding with the properties of my thought. Not, as the Neo-Kantians claimed, because my thought exercises an inevitable influence over things, but because it is itself an object. Being of 'this world', it partakes of the same nature as the world" ([1955] 2012, 56). Lest we think that he is thereby underlining Kant's naturalistic assertion that individuals, or societies as according to Durkheim, come to have the

same set of categories by virtue of being in nature, in *Totemism* ([1962] 2005), Lévi-Strauss goes to tremendous lengths to specify that the categories implied by the totemic system of social stratification are not the product of the working out of divisions in nature through human relations or, conversely, the use of nature to represent human relations. He writes, "the question arises why the animal and vegetable domain should offer a specifically favorable nomenclature for denoting a social system, and what relations exist logically between the system of denotation and the system that is denoted. The animal world and that of the plant life are not utilized merely because they are there, but because they suggest a mode of thought" ([1962] 2005, 13). And what they suggest is "a homology, not so much within the system of denotation, but between differential features existing, on the one hand, between species x and y, and on the other, between clan a and clan b" ([1962] 2005, 13).

We may interpret this as saying that although thinking is an activity in the world, the world is not isomorphic with nature. One cannot draw intelligibility from the natural world but rather has to give an account of the relation between nature and society in each instance. In the case of the totemic mode of thought, nature is neither acted upon by thought nor does it direct thought. It provides structural relations (x is to y) that are homologous with social relations (as a is to b). Nature and society are not therefore separate and independent. The interlacing of them within the totemic system suggests a relation of the type of a feedback loop.

This particular coil between nature and society is put to effective use by anthropologists of Amazonia, such as Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2014), who shows how Amazonian perspectivism reverses the usual set up of one biological nature and many cultures to posit one culture encompassing both animals and humans and multiple biological natures or species. Lévi-Strauss is credited with providing the framework for making this reversal comprehensible in so far as he focuses on neither individual subjects nor their interrelations but their position within larger structures, which suggest pathways by which one element may transform into another. In his essay "How Do We Recognize Structuralism?" (2004), Gilles Deleuze underlines this aspect of internal dynamism within Lévi-Strauss's structures by claiming that the latter insisted on their topological and relational nature. He goes so far as to claim that Lévi-Strauss's structures were multiplicities of virtual existence (2004, 179). Although structures exist before individuals and events, each individual and event finds differentiated and distinctive actualizations and expressions through them.

Finally, I would suggest that Lévi-Strauss did not only extend a Kantian understanding of thinking to the world without the Kantian subject and loosen the hold of naturalism upon Kantianism (we already saw how Mauss loosened the hold of rationalism upon Kantianism). In the process, Lévi-Strauss elaborated a dimension of thought to rival Kant's. In it classification, or the ordering into categories, that is, units of relations of elements within structures of the kind sketched previously, was equally germane as the act of cognition within Kant's architectonic. It is noteworthy that Durkheim, too, spoke of classification in *The Elementary Forms*, but he separated them from the categories. He considered classification as a linguistic gloss upon the categories, with different languages providing different classifications of the categories. In contrast, Lévi-Strauss claims classification to be every bit as formal as apperception, judgment, or schematism, the functions within Kant's system of thinking. While I would claim that *The Savage Mind* ([1962] 1966) and the volumes of work on the *Mythologiques* provide testimony to my speculation, I limit myself to a few quotes from *The Savage Mind*. In them, Lévi-Strauss makes clear that totemism is only a specific form of

classification: "so-called totemism is in fact only a particular case of the general problem of classification and one of the many examples of the part which specific terms often play in the working out of a social classification" ([1962] 1966, 62). Classification fulfills intellectual desires, rather than just the need to domesticate the world for practical purposes: "The real question is not whether the touch of a woodpecker's beak does in fact cure toothache. It is rather whether there is a point of view from which a woodpecker's beak and a man's tooth can be as 'going together' . . . and whether some initial order can be introduced into the universe by means of these groupings" ([1962] 1966, 9). And finally, to show how this mode of knowledge production is the obverse of Kant's, he states: "The truth of the matter is that *the principle underlying a classification can never be postulated in advance*. It can only be discovered a posteriori by ethnographic investigation, that is, by experience" ([1962] 1966, 58).

Speaking of Lévi-Strauss's wider project, Claude Imbert provides a similar perspective. In "On Anthropological Knowledge" (2009), Imbert claims that Lévi-Strauss offered a new perspective on thinking distinct from the Kantian view: "Viewing structuralism against such a background, which surely was not clear to Levi-Strauss from the start and was further elaborated in the four volumes of the *Mythologiques*, we are nearer to the problem that lies at the core of his successive approaches to fieldwork, ethnography and anthropology: negatively, to avoid propositional unities – to which the *mythemes* occasionally offered a substitute – positively, to promote a logic of qualities (compare the oppositions raw/cooked, naked/clothes, etc.) to address a man deprived of the European common dressing of language, divested of a propositional *cogito* and its phenomenological stance, no longer a subject facing an object, a human being most able to implant on his/her cognitive abilities different and new symbolisms…" (2009, 123).

Pluralizing Reason, and Ethics versus Morals

Between the period Durkheim pronounced a new science of the categories of the collective understanding to the period when Lévi-Strauss wrote about classification as another element within the Kantian architectonic, that is the first half of the 20th century, there was a slow swell of sentiment within social and cultural anthropology that it was unseemly, if not downright problematic, that anthropologists appropriated and represented their subjects from a vantage not granted to them, that is, self-reflection. The turn away from such arrogation of voice to more inclusivity of subjects' own reflections meant that there was much less engagement with anthropological questions that were once germane to Kant's first critique, such as, what is thinking? And, what is error in thinking?

As a consequence, the influence of Kant upon anthropology is more dispersed in the second half of the 20th century into the present. There are two possible lines of influence, and maybe more. First, anthropologists take up for consideration Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* to ask whether the anthropology to which it refers is a forerunner of modern anthropology. This interest in Kant's *Anthropology* was produced by anthropology's engagement with the philosopher Michel Foucault for whom this text was his point of entry into Kant's works. In particular, he asked how such a text, more a compilation of lectures than a formal work, much more interested in human behavior than in delineating the structure of thought, morality, and reflective judgment, was read with respect to Kant's other works.

Second, while anthropologists have always studied religion and morality, in the early 21st century there has been an outpouring of writings on ethics. Anthropologists of ethics have engaged Kant's writings on morality and practical reason, showing clear lines of difference from earlier engagements with morality, such as by Durkheim, and newer influences, such as by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The enduring effect of these two lines of engagement has been to open up reason to ethnographic study, pluralizing it, to posit ethics as a new field of study and to give prominence to the question as to whether it is the same human across all societies, leading some anthropologists to echo but also transfigure Foucault's question as to whether the human is ever knowable.

Despite the fact Kant's *Anthropology* has historically never been accorded the philosophical importance compared to the critiques (Jacobs and Kain 2003), Foucault translated *Anthropology* and provided an introduction to it as his dissertation, and discussed it in his *History of Madness* (Foucault [1961] 2008). This move indicated his interest in pragmatic reason over pure and practical reason in so far as the pragmatic indicated material action, whereas pure and practical still remained a priori and prescriptive. As Deleuze has importantly qualified Foucault's Kantianism, Foucault was always more interested in the conditions of experience than in the conditions of possibility of experience (Deleuze [1986] 2004). That is, Foucault was oriented toward the historical and the contingent rather than the idealist dimension of knowledge and action.

A large part of Foucault's introduction is concerned with showing that *Anthropology* is related and at the same time to be distinguished from the critiques, which are referenced by "law and morality in their pure states," "fundamental freedom," and "legal rule." Of *Anthropology* he writes: "Thus a whole network of relations are woven together [in *Anthropology*], where neither the law nor morality are ever present in their pure states, but where their intersection creates the space in which human action is played out . . . This is not the level of fundamental freedom, nor that of legal rule," but "pragmatic freedom, which is all about pretentions and ruses, dishonorable intentions and dissimulations, secret attempts to gain control, and compromises reached" ([1961] 2008, 43–44). Foucault makes the important point that *Anthropology* is not about "the history of culture" nor "an analysis of its successive forms" but "the practice . . . of a culture already given in advance . . . It [practice] teaches man to recognize within his own culture what the world teaches him" ([1961] 2008, 54). Foucault retains Kant's transcendental idealism in taking culture as given in advance, while also making Kant out to be an empiricist in so far as *Anthropology* is treated as an exposition of practice. However, here, too, he resists treating *Anthropology* as a straightforward inventory of man and his practices, claiming that *Anthropology* shows "the un-founded in the conditioned" ([1961] 2008, 71), how practice is hollow and does not know its ends.

At the end of his analysis, Foucault makes the remarkable claim that the way to understand *Anthropology* in relation to the critiques is to see *Anthropology* as exposing and exploring the anthropological illusion that man is knowable, much as the critiques expose and elaborate the transcendental illusion that the world is knowable ([1961] 2008, 122). For him, Kant's quest in *Anthropology* is necessarily negative and seeks to limit claims upon the figure of the human. "Another (which is just another version of the same oversight) has been to turn anthropology into a positive field which would serve as the basis for the possibility of all the human sciences, whereas in fact it can only speak the language of the limit and of negativity: its sole purpose is to convey, from the vigour of critical thought to the transcendental foundation, the

precedence of finitude" ([1961] 2008, 121). In many ways, Foucault's introduction is the prolegomenon to his 1966 *Order of Things* that ends with the famous words: "If those arrangements [disciplines for human knowledge] were to disappear as they appeared . . . then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the end of the sea" ([1966] 1994, 387).

Foucault modulates his emphasis upon the negative aspects of Kant's work in his later writings in which he takes up Kant's essay "What Is Enlightenment?" to show how Kant was not just attentive to posterity but also alert to the present (Foucault 1984). Even though the present in Kant's essay was cast in negative terms, as an exit or way out of immaturity, it was also understood as an ongoing activity. Foucault makes stark the central paradox of freedom and necessity within the practice of reason for Kant as "the right to think as one pleases as long as one obeys as one must" but shows how Kant subverted the usual division of freedom of reason within the private as long as one was obedient in public, to underline that for Kant reason required free form in public. Finally, he shows Kant not so much as marking the birth of the modern era but as evolving a modern attitude that showed an acute awareness of the present and the necessity to establish a relationship to oneself, which Foucault took to be in continuity with what had come before in the notion of the *ethos* in Greek thought. This attitude, its inculcation through different practices of self-fashioning, was to be important for Foucault in his later works. He describes it as the means of self-capacitation without creating new power relations or intensifying existing ones.

As Zammito notes, although Kant uses the term "anthropology" to indicate the study of humans, he did not mean humans in their social and cultural diversity as within the modern discipline of anthropology. Rather, Kant's focus was on the human capacity for self-consciousness. Sandra Laugier (2020) also maintains that Kant's philosophical anthropology does not bear any relation to social and cultural anthropology. First, whereas the focus of philosophical anthropology had been *the human* in general, which has lately become the human *in general*, the focus of modern anthropology is resolutely humans in their particularity (208). Second, although Kant allowed for the possibility of anthropology as a separate and independent domain of inquiry to take further the question of what is man, philosophical anthropology (embodied for Laugier in such diverse figures as Heidegger and Habermas) continues to reassert "the monopoly of philosophy over anthropology" (209). Thus philosophical anthropology has yet to move beyond laying claims to doing anthropology when they are "philosophizing," to asking how anthropology as an independent domain of inquiry might collaborate with philosophy (210).

Foucault's introduction to Kant's *Anthropology* contributes to the discussion on the difference between philosophical anthropology and modern anthropology by making clear that the latter cannot unproblematically presume a straightforward lineage from Kant's *Anthropology* to anthropology's present. For Foucault, it is evident that Kant raises the question of what is man only to suggest that there are limits to what can be known, if indeed man can be known at all. And the unknowability of man may have to do with the fact that this object of inquiry is a representation, a creation, of the mind as with everything else that it encounters. Be that as it may, it is interesting to see how attempts are still made to make Kant's anthropology relevant to modern anthropology in the works of three contemporary anthropologists, all of whom

draw considerable inspiration from Foucault in their wider work. While all three may have engaged Kant across their careers over diverse writings, I focus on those writings in which they most directly engage with the philosopher.

Paul Rabinow is an important figure because of his efforts to bring Foucault to the United States, by translating and introducing many of Foucault's writings and lectures (see Rabinow 1997). In an early essay "Beyond Ethnography: Anthropology as Nominalism" (1988), Rabinow engages Foucault's introduction to Kant's *Anthropology* by assimilating Foucault's Kant to the cause of modern anthropology as a positive field of inquiry. According to Rabinow, Kant's pragmatic anthropology shows us how the question of "what is man" cannot just be answered transcendentally, through universals of the human mind and morality, but also empirically, through the study of practices. The fact that relations to self and others are singular in content but universal in form testify to Kant's division between the particular and the universal, but also to their co-imbrication in the realm of practices. "Anthropology taken pragmatically occupies that place where humans learn to recognize their own cultures as . . . a kind of *Bildungsroman* of daily life, in which universality and particularity are joined in a singular relationship" (1988, 356). Thus for Rabinow, the pragmatic provides a hook between the universal and the particular and makes practices the best way to access both as co-extant, maybe even co-emergent. According to Rabinow, as the concept of culture has become increasingly irrelevant within modern anthropology, re-engaging Kant may give the discipline a new lease on life by providing new objects of inquiry, notably reason and society. He writes: "we can analyze reason in the same way we analyze other ethnographic objects, that is, as a set of social practices bearing complex *pragmatic* relations with a congeries of symbols" (1988, 360, emphasis in original). And further on, he writes, "another term whose practices and symbols we have failed to take sufficiently nominalistically is society" (1988, 360).

Several points are worth noting in comparing Rabinow to Foucault in their treatment of Kant's *Anthropology*. Rabinow dispenses with the sense of pessimism and finitude that informs Foucault's reading of Kant's *Anthropology* (see also Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986). He is not suspicious of philosophy's claims upon anthropology. Rather, he reads the term "pragmatic" as securing anthropology's claim to knowledge beyond ideation and speculation. He makes the universal coextensive, even possibly co-emergent with the particular. This enables him to subject "reason," the most transcendental form of thinking, to ethnographic study through practices and symbols, and makes "society," which according to him has acquired a transcendental status within anthropology, also itself subject to ethnographic study. They are not quite the same move. He particularizes reason while disclosing the claim to universality by society.

Doing a generous reading of Rabinow, one can say that he provides a means for us to understand how philosophy and anthropology may derive benefit from each other. A more ungenerous reading would be to say that he misses or ignores Foucault's warning. The human does not appear as a problematic object of inquiry within Rabinow's essay. He appears to re-entrench anthropology as an unreflexively empirical science. However, in his own research, examining the emergence of new frontiers within the biotech industry, Rabinow seems to have taken up a task that he claimed Foucault to have abandoned, which is to remain vigilant to

emergent *episteme*s with their distinctive configurations of knowledge, power, and care. Here the human as *anthropos* is much more centrally positioned as as-yet unknown (Rabinow and Keller 2016).

Along with Rabinow, Michael Fischer is another anthropologist to have engaged Kant's *Anthropology*. While Fischer gives credit to Foucault as having most recently reanimated interest in Kant within anthropology, his own engagement with Kant's *Anthropology* takes a slightly different tack (Fischer 2009). Fischer is attentive to the tonality of Kant's *Anthropology*, underlining that for Kant the human is the most opaque of objects and that Kant's text is rent with tensions and instabilities, which Fischer finds to be generative. In particular he points to how Kant's *Anthropology* is interested in the gaps between "regulative ideals and ethnographic realities" (2009, 220), the tension between methods or critiques or what he further explicates as "critique and . . . experiential knowledge" (2009, 220), and "problems of evil, human conflict, and the mismatch between individual intentions, system dynamics, social forces at different scales, between the *polis* and *kosmopolis*, nation-state and global competitions" (2009, 222). While Fischer indicates that philosophical anthropology, what he calls Anthropology with a capital *A*, is distinct from present-day anthropology, which he presents as an earthbound discipline indicated by a small *a*, he nonetheless appears to feel that Kant was advocating for anthropology of the second type. At one point he says "Kant privileged real-world experience" (2009, 216) and at another that Kant insisted that philosophy could not be done without anthropology, "that anthropology is the proper name for the general questions about human beings, our societies, our cultural forms, our interactions with the world around us . . ." (2009, 229), which makes Fischer sound as if he was reading Kant somewhat anachronistically.

Curiously, there is a biographical focus on Kant in Fischer's article that situates the philosopher in the port city of Königsberg, a multicultural milieu, and pictures him as a stoic Christian, inspired by Rousseau, and a sympathetic reader of travel writings. This figure resonates with the way Lévi-Strauss portrayed Rousseau in "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Founder of the Sciences of Man" (1976) and presented himself within *Tristes Tropiques*. It almost makes Kant himself, and not just his *Anthropology*, into the precursor of the modern anthropologist. Fischer goes so far as to say that he seeks to show how Kant and his era was neither as ethnocentric nor parochial as has been depicted. However, in so doing, he neglects the long-standing postcolonial critique of Kant as deeply racist and misogynist, an instance of which is to be found in Gayatri Spivak's "Philosophy" within *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999). There has been much discussion of Kant's understanding of racial difference and colonialism (see Flikschuh and Ypi 2014). Although it would appear that Kant arrived at a point of critique of the violent excesses of European overseas adventurism and colonialism, Spivak points to the fact that as late in his career as when he was writing the third critique, Kant maintained an understanding of the savage as closed off from the workings of reason, morality, and reflective judgment. In other words, certain humans were closed off from the promise of the universality of reason. In a parallel to Rosalind Morris's assessment that the concept of the sublime represented Kant's effort to recover reason even in the face of overwhelming sense experience that exceeded comprehension, Spivak claims that while the sublime might save the man of reason, the savage is shown to be unable to recover from the fear of the sublime, experienced as an abyss. The native informant is always figured as being "foreclosed" from the structures of subjectivity, which makes it epistemologically possible for Europe to be plotted *as* subject (1999, 6). Spivak writes: "We find here the axiomatics of

imperialism as a natural argument to indicate the limits of the cognition of (cultural) man" (1999, 26). It points to a gap between anthropological and postcolonial writings that neither finds the other's engagement with Kant worth discussing.

In "The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East: Notes on Islamic Public Argument" (1993), Talal Asad develops a separate line of critique of Kant that helps in bridging anthropological and postcolonial approaches to Kant. He claims that if societies seek to know their histories they must begin with European history and historical categories as the structure of knowledge production is such that societies can only know themselves "according to their distance from Enlightenment and liberal models" (1993, 200). Yet the political period of early modernity was clearly absolutist and raises interesting questions as to how someone such as Kant could advocate the public use of reason given the constraints on freedom. Thus Asad's way to deal with the self-proclaimed universality of European figures and texts is not to point to their possibilities and foreclosures, as in the case of Fischer and Spivak, but to parochialize them, such that they become a local species of reasoning to be compared to other species of reasoning, in Asad's case that of religious scholars in Saudi Arabia.

The focus in Asad's essay is on Kant's "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" (1991). In contrast to Foucault's reading of the essay (1984), Asad reads it not for its inauguration of a modern attitude but for the fact that Kant appears to strike a bargain with the sovereign, that is, to publicly practice reason while maintaining obedience to the law and to the authority of the sovereign. This would seem to make good sense, as the law and the sovereign are the guarantors of freedom. Yet Kant places even further limits upon the public practice of reason by making it the privilege of a few, with refrains upon open criticism. Furthermore, as Asad points out, historically the most vociferous criticisms of the law and the sovereign had come from religious figures. With the consignment of religion and morality to the private sphere and its replacement by the public use of secular reason, Kant may be seen to be complicit with the quieting of criticism rather than with its public flourishing. Thus by bringing in the historical context in which Kant was writing, Asad aims to show how we are dealing with only a specific kind of reasoning and how it may be compared to other kinds of reasoning in other contexts. I understand Asad to be pluralizing reason, making it comparable across diverse settings.

Before we consider any influence Kant may have exercised on the anthropology of ethics, it is worthwhile sketching out his project within *Critique of Practical Reason* to understand why he felt compelled to write it after claiming that *Critique of Pure Reason* concluded his critical work once and for all. It will also help ground the anthropological critiques of Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason* was to be Kant's one and only book that decisively put to rest reason's claim to knowledge of metaphysical objects. By limiting and thus securing the basis of knowledge, he hoped to rescue reason from both metaphysical dogmatism and intellectual skepticism. Upon completing the book, noting its public misrecognition followed by his attempt to provide an abridgment of it in *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* as well as a second (B) edition of the first critique, Kant realized that he needed to show that reason had a positive role to play in human existence beyond that of provoking humans to overreach what they can possibly know. To ground his claim that reason directs one to act morally, which he took to be a positive role played by reason, he produced a number of writings on the theme of practical

reason, morality, and the question of freedom, primary among them *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *Metaphysics of Morals*, and *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*.

In these writings, Kant germinated the idea that one is obliged to act morally by the force of the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative, the universal ethical form of the moral law, dictates we treat humans as ends in themselves and not as means, and has the status of the divine within us. Reason originates and mediates the imperative to us. While the imperative has the force of a necessity, one both retains the freedom to realize it in one's acts and, paradoxically, one is at one's most free in claiming the hold of the categorical imperative upon oneself. While the *Groundwork* evolves the notion of the categorical imperative, the second critique systematizes the work of practical reason with respect to the imperative by showing how a priori synthetic judgments of morality are possible, while the *Metaphysics* delineates how political rights and individual virtues also constitute practical morality.

Here we consider four anthropologists who have engaged Kant's writings on morality. In his essay "For an Anthropology of Ethics and Freedom" (2002), James Laidlaw makes the provocative claim that there has never been an anthropology of ethics. Although Durkheim put morality, moral obligations, and moral facts at the center of society, his focus on the moral has not been sustained within the history of the discipline. Yet despite this early emphasis on morality, Laidlaw does not see Durkheim's neglected project as the right point of entry into a possible anthropology of ethics. That is because "Durkheim's conception of the social so completely identifies the collective with the good that an independent understanding of ethics appears neither necessary nor possible" (2002, 312). And in an interesting fillip, Laidlaw shows that although Durkheim appeared to be completing Kant's project for him by showing where the categories of the understanding and the categorical imperative come from, that is, from society, he was in fact impoverishing Kant's system. "Durkheim's 'social' is, effectively, Immanuel Kant's notion of the moral law, with the all-important change that the concept of human freedom, which was of course central for Kant, has been neatly excised from it" (2002, 312). Further on he writes that where Kant highlights the tensions between man as part of a natural world, subject to cause and effect, and man as a free and rational being, for Durkheim this is not of concern because man is first and foremost bound by the social and finds expression only through the social. This socializing of the transcendental figure of the thinking subject has the effect of rubbing out all complexity of life for Laidlaw, such as concerns over the good life, constraints on reasoning, doubts, and so on, the very substance of an anthropology of ethics. Departing from both Kant's prescriptive morality and Durkheim's collapse of morality into society, Laidlaw draws on Nietzsche, Jainism, and Foucault to show how a genealogy of values is ethnographically possible. He ends by saying that if we do not take the social and the individual within the collective as pregiven, and instead we think of them as ongoing processes and projects informed by "ideals, values, models, practices, relationships, and institutions," then it becomes incumbent upon anthropologists to study them. This last statement would seem to suggest the entirety of anthropology is the anthropology of ethics.

While Veena Das might agree with Laidlaw's assessment that all of anthropology is one of ethics in so far as ideation and life are interrelated, she may balk at the emphasis Laidlaw places on freedom, or more specifically individual autonomy, as necessary for ethicality. While Das has engaged Kant off and on in many of her writings, I focus on one that brings particular

pressures to bear on Kant's understanding of freedom and morality. In "Ordinary Ethics" (2012), Das summarizes one of her most intrinsic positions on ethics, namely that ethics is not produced at a distance from everyday life but from within its hurly-burly. Habits, often considered settled, unthinking tendencies, are given the status of moral action by Das. As such ethics does not presume the necessity of freedom. She juxtaposes this position to Kant's in saying that "unlike both Kant and Frege, whose intellectual Platonist conception of norms leads us to think that to assess the correction of an action we must always be able to make at least an implicit reference to a rule or a principle that must be evoked and made explicit, for Wittgenstein it is the quality of practice that makes it evident that performance of explicit rules does not form an autonomous stratum that could exist without the support of other expressions of norms that he called customs and habits"(2012, 140). Further on she draws on Cora Diamond to critique Kant's easy marriage of morality and freedom that "when moral life is tied too closely to notions of choice and of freedom exercised in the capacity to choose, other forms of moral activity become invisible" (2012, 134). She cites the example of a female prisoner in Iran who collaborates with prison administration. Word of this earns her a rebuke and divorce from her husband, who himself has escaped imprisonment and is living abroad. Das questions whether the woman's actions are meaningfully seen through the prism of freedom or individual autonomy, whether the study of ethics doesn't wrongfully focus on her choice to collaborate when ethics, or its failure, is much more apparent in the wounding judgment levied by those not in a similar situation of imprisonment and suffering. This story would confound any clear-cut assumption of imperatives, rules, and the necessity of freedom within a Kantian paradigm. Thus Das's picture of ethics is one in which such work of ethics is ongoing, although it may only come into view at particular moments and cannot be taken for granted.

The positions eked out are to rescue the anthropology of ethics from the totalizing embrace of society and to raise the possibility of ethics as collective action or its failure, even when the question of freedom or individual autonomy is fraught. In his introduction to his edited collection *Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language, and Action* (2010), Michael Lambek continues these very inquiries among others. He raises the possibility that a non-Kantian and non-Durkheimian notion of the social may help us to more productively explore the interrelations between ethics and the social. He writes that "where Kantian ethics begins with reason and its objectification in propositional language, many of us try to evade Kantian oppositions between sense and reason by returning to Aristotle and locating ethics first in practice and action (2010, 7)." To help further elaborate Aristotle, he draws upon Hannah Arendt's notion of work and labor as two modes of making, with labor conducive to an Aristotelian notion of ethical practice and activity. As with Laidlaw, he draws upon Foucault, in particular his notion of self-fashioning, to suggest how selves are made in interconnection with others. These maneuvers allow for ethics to be studied in relation to society and history, but without being straitjacketed to moral rules or obligations. In addressing the question of freedom for ethics, he returns to Foucault to show how he upheld the pursuit of freedom but without limiting freedom to Kantian understandings of acting in conformity with reason, nor in the absence of power relations. To make these insights more explicit from within anthropology, Lambek relies upon Roy Rappaport, an important interlocutor for him. In particular he draws on Rappaport's understanding of ritual to say: the "conjunction of being freely present to one's act and submitting to an order that is not of one's own making are the two dimensions that in Rappaport's analysis are intrinsic to ritual" (2010, 27).

Joel Robbins pitches a different move within the field of discussions on the anthropology of ethics, which, as we have seen, very self-consciously positions itself in contrast, even in opposition to Kant and Durkheim. In "What Is the Matter with Transcendence? On the Place of Religion in the New Anthropology of Ethics" (2016), he sees Durkheim as adding value to Kant's position from an entirely different angle than that of the social. He says: "Against a Kantian emphasis on the demandingness of moral norms, he [Durkheim] argues that moral ends cannot be merely a matter of duty or obligation; they must also be 'desirable and desired'" (2016, 779). This recalls the Durkheim as he appears within Singh's and Mazzarella's writings, that is, interested in the social as structure and force. Robbins's article expresses his admiration for the new anthropology of ethics for its renewed attention to the everyday and the ordinary but also his fear that it stands to occlude religion as a formal institution with a transcendental figure, overarching ideals and goals, sacred texts and prescriptions, which are equally operative within the lives of anthropological subjects. Furthermore, he sees ritual as intrinsic to making these transcendental values apparent and desirable within ordinary lives. "By deploying symbols that affect such a transfer between the sensory and the ideological, ritual becomes 'precisely a mechanism that periodically converts the obligatory into the desirable'" (2016, 776).

Potentiating Anthropology, and the Romanticism that Could Be versus the Romanticism That Is

In "Socializing the Transcendental Subject, and Classification pace Cognition" and "Pluralizing Reason, and Ethics versus Morals," we have considered Kant's influence on anthropologists past and present through their direct reference to his work. Those of his writings that have drawn greatest engagement are the first critique on epistemology, the second critique and cognate writings on morality, his lectures on anthropology, and his essay on the Enlightenment. Although a few make mention of his concept of beauty (Mazzarella) and that of the sublime (Morris, Spivak), they are mostly read against the grain to suggest how, fearing external influences (such as by inanimate nature or nonhumans), Kant proposed concepts that corralled such influence. However, these passing references do not do justice to the richness of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* in which he attempts to attend to the relationship between freedom and necessity after considering necessity through pure and practical reason, as grounded by the mechanistic laws undergirding nature, and the categorical imperative undergirding morality (although of course freedom was presumed in moral action). He does so by showing how our most individual, spontaneous experiences, such as that of agreeableness, beauty, awe, are simultaneously subjective and universal. Giving judgment the status of a faculty, as opposed to serving the faculty of the understanding as in the first critique, he considers how judgment does not merely determine what something is but also reflects on this something. This reflective judgment, seemingly subjective, evinces systematicity giving it the status of the universal.

The first part of *Critique of the Power of Judgment* constitutes Kant's major contribution to a theorization of aesthetics, as opposed to epistemology and morality, in which aesthetics is shown to be a part of morality. The second half of the third critique deals with the notion of teleology in nature and is not seen to fit well with the first. However, in so far as this second part is concerned with delineating a specific kind of purposiveness without purpose within nature, that is, as an orientation within the nature toward complexity and perfectibility

without a notion of final ends, we may extrapolate that Kant also intended to show how aesthetics, similar to epistemology and morality, is in concordance with nature. If we are to understand the creativity ascribed to nature by aesthetics to be in accord with nature as law-like and moral as in the first two critiques, it means that aesthetic experiences derive from structures given to us by the world, by the very aspects we attribute to the world. In other words, humans do not stand apart from the represented world, but are in it and structured by it. It is a condition of mutual implicatedness.

In early-21st-century writings within Kant scholarship, the third critique has been shown to be very romantic in its orientation, in so far as it was concerned with aesthetical experience and its embeddedness in nature. What has also become apparent is how much Kant's work influenced the German romantic tradition, which includes figures such as Novalis, Friedrich and August Schlegel, and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. In fact, they considered the romantic project to be a continuation of Kant's own. This Kantian inflection has meant a revision of the common understanding of romanticism as a revolt against the arid rationalism associated with Kant toward an understanding of romanticism as extending, deepening, even transfiguring his inquiries. In particular, romantics were concerned with the divide that Kant took for granted between the world in itself and the world as appearance and sought to overcome this divide from within Kant's terms. As only the prior understanding of German romanticism, that is, as a revolt against reason, influenced social and cultural anthropology, there is not much scholarship examining the impact of Kant's romanticism and a Kantian-inflected romanticism upon anthropology. However, there is much to be gained from exploring how this growing field of Kant studies has been mobilized, albeit limitedly, and may be further mobilized for the purposes of anthropology, particularly as anthropology becomes more interested in engaging questions of environmental devastation, human implicatedness in nature, uncertain futures, and aesthetics as a mode of expression and form of politics.

As this is less a review and more an invitation, what follows is an exploration of the romantic figures who have been influenced by and who mediate Kant to the few anthropologists who have either an explicit interest in romanticism or whose work touches on central romantic themes such as the relationship of mind to matter, parts to the whole, finite to the infinite, one and the many, or self and nature in its many diverse, disequilibrious binaries and polarities as a means to bridge the divide between the world as given and in itself, to access the whole (Nasser 2014). In particular, the Kant-influenced figures are Novalis and Schelling, and the anthropologists who have engaged them directly. The next turn is to a review of the anthropological work influenced by an earlier understanding of romanticism, viewed as a reaction against Kant and a celebration of irrationality and subjectivity, concluding with a comparison of the different vantages upon anthropological inquiries provided by each. Drawing on a term favored by the romantics, this is an effort to potentiate or romanticize anthropology by drawing it closer to both faces of romanticism.

Novalis, the pen name of Friedrich Leopold von Hardenberg, was very influenced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Fichte was instrumental in engaging Kant and thus making him available to German romantics such as Novalis. Fichte's contribution to Kant studies was to suggest that while for Kant thinking was prompted by sense impressions from the world, that is, through encounters with the world, for Fichte it was more convincing that the movement to thinking was prompted within the self, by the self making itself an object of reflection and representation. In other words, it is through objectifying oneself that one realized that one,

the reflected self, was in the world. Given romanticism's interest in the whole or the absolute, that is, that which exists in and of itself without predication, this movement of the self to posit and understand oneself as part of the world seemed a productive way to explore how the absolute might similarly dawn upon oneself.

Novalis was initially very convinced by Fichte but through his own engagement with Kant came to accept Kant's division between the world as representations and the world in itself. Although Novalis did not give up the quest for the absolute, he felt that one could only do so through the finiteness of the self and not through its imagined overcoming. Furthermore, he took seriously Kant's claim that the most subjective experience, such as that of beauty in art, was also the most universal, transfiguring it to mean that immersion in feeling provided a means to the whole (Novalis (1876) 2015).

This philosophical position is beautifully explored within the context of anthropology by Andrew Brandel. His position is not that philosophy provides a question which then anthropology takes up for investigation, but rather a question that plagues philosophy gets a possible response within the scope of anthropology and vice versa. His interest is to develop a companionate relationship between the two that is much different from that of philosophical anthropology that disallows the independence of anthropology from philosophy. In two essays, Brandel explores the contours of this relationship. While it is beyond the scope of the article to do full justice to these essays, there is one strand within the earlier of the two essays that explicitly addresses Novalis's project and that brings his insights into conversation with anthropology's own self-representation.

In "Triste Romantik: Ruminations on an Ethnographic Encounter with Philosophy" (2015), Brandel summarizes Novalis's project this way: "Self-consciousness, for Fichte, is immediate, in the sense of the self presented to itself unmediated (unrepresented), thus as intellectual intuition. But Novalis will assert the mediate quality of intellectual intuition, asserting that one is only ever encountering him- or herself in the mirror, thereby affirming the Kantian divide with the supersensible substratum" (2015, 316). He affirms Novalis attending to feeling: "The Romantics radicalized the Kantian and post-Kantian position, shifting the emphasis to the personal, rather than the moral, register. This was to be the ultimate individualist ethics—tied as much to choice as personal experience. What then of love? Beiser articulates this far more succinctly than I could: 'We realize our common humanity, and we develop our unique individuality, the Romantics often insisted, only through love. It is through love that we unify our opposing powers—that we reconcile our reason and sensibility—because in loving someone I act on the rational principles of duty from, rather than contrary to, inclination'" (2015, 314). And in an incredible act of bridging, Brandel claims that anthropology provides romanticism with an empirical demonstration of love: "This cultivation, or *Bildung*, which the ethnographer undergoes, is both fundamentally individual and at the same time contingent on the other. To love here is always to love *someone*. Self-realization is a process one undergoes in the company of others; it is propagated in the name of the self, through its powers, but a self that, we see in love, is always with-others and which could never be otherwise. Anthropology, for me, then is an act of love" (2015, 314). While fully cognizant of anthropology's complicity with colonialism and imperialism, Brandel suggests how the task that anthropology gives itself, the anthropology that stands alongside the anthropology that is, is one of seeing the marks left by others upon oneself. In "The Art of Conviviality" (2016), Brandel states this more explicitly: "And if anthropological thought is

thus fragmentary, ever striving, constantly upended by life, then we must rethink the ways we tell the stories of our discipline and approach that history likewise in an ethnographic mode—not through an *account* of the lives of others but by living with them and allowing them to mark us" (2016, 308). Speaking of Lévi-Strauss and his extension of the romantic project: "The stakes then are not in the tolerance of multiple, adjacent, intransigent worlds but with possibilities for being together" (2016, 339).

Just as anthropology has something to offer Novalis in his exploration and understanding of the variegated nature of love and immersion in feeling, Novalis has something to offer to anthropology as it comes to a new problematic, that of realizing the limits of what can be known about the other, the problem that Brandel, drawing upon Cavell and Das, calls skepticism and that in "Pluralizing Reason, and Ethics versus Morals" was worded as knowing the limits of the human. In expositing skepticism, Brandel writes: "The moment of skepticism, when it is generalized as to make life itself suspect, Das contends, begins a 'spiritual failure,' the acknowledgment and acceptance of the limits of knowledge—it is in fact a failure in the ethics of acknowledgement" (2015, 303). Later he writes, "What I have learned from Das in life and in words is a notion of ethnographic encounter as a moment of waiting—by the author —for a marking of knowledge, by the other . . . I want to explore the possibility that such a view opens up for a Romantic understanding of the sort of encounter made possible by the *work* of art" (2015, 303). Through romanticism one learns that "the work of art allows us to encounter the whole world" (2015, 311). Further on, "beauty allows us to attend to and feel the object, thus leading us to uncover the singularity, as a unified whole, present immediately in its appearance in history" (2015, 311). Brandel argues that art, the hold it has on one, draws attention to the fact that our task as ethnographers is not to know and account for our interlocutors but to recognize the poetry that is their life: "poetry is nothing but the ordinary and peculiar way in which life is, as a matter of fact, lived" (2015, 316). "We might not be aware of our 'enacting' of the knowledge of others, and yet it is inscribed upon us. It moves through us, in a subconscious (we might even say necessarily unknowable) marking" (2015, 304). The romantic understanding of the work of art provides anthropology with this response to the problem of skepticism.

I was also inspired by Novalis in my paper "At Play with the Giants: Between the Patchy Anthropocene and Romantic Geology" (2019). I work with another important insight ascribed to Novalis, which is his interest in the human in nature. I draw upon the history of geology and the place of geology in Novalis's writings to show how it was romantic interest in nature that nurtured scientific curiosity about the material world. I write, "the scientific discipline of geology emerged out of the late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century romantic interest in the earth as part of its efforts to put humans back into nature" (2019, S000). Through a dive into Novalis's writings that specifically reference the subsurface of the earth, I explain that what interests me in romantic geology "is the manner in which the surface of the earth was experienced as an other but also one by which to know oneself as an other, to be able to use the impresses on one's mind and the body's proportions and sensations as the means by which to experience something outside of ordinary apprehension, often marked as the exterior, the infinite, the gigantic . . ." (2019, S000). This insight drawn from romantic geology resonates with Brandel's understanding of how the other marks you but extends it to the material world and nature. And in keeping with Novalis's Kantian orientation that there is no easy possibility of an unmediated relationship with the world and nature, it recognizes that this equivalence between mind and body, and the other is really a way to work around the

problem of not being able to understand something of which one does not nor cannot have experience, such as the geological timescale, by grasping it in flashes of inspired imagining: "Applying these provocations to my question of the scale of the gigantic leads me to speculate that giantism may present itself to subjectivity within the ordinary, that is, it does not need to be scaled to be experienced, and that this experience may be found within humans becoming nonhumans to themselves" (2019, S000). Thus romantic geology, or more specifically Novalis, helps me to explore how the aspect of the human as a geological force within the Anthropocene may be experienced within the finitude and particularity of the human.

My commitment to romanticism as the means by which Kant's philosophy may enter and be newly productive for social and cultural anthropology is more fully explored in my book manuscript "River Life and The Upspring of Nature." While it is beyond the scope of this article to track the several figures who are important for me, including Kant, Schelling, Goethe, and Novalis, here the focus is on Schelling as both taking forward Kant's problematic and the romantic orientation through his *Naturphilosophie*. Schelling claimed that just as it was possible to give an account of the subject coming into self-consciousness, it was also equally possible and imperative to give an account of nature coming into realization of its full potential (Schelling [1797] 1988, [1799] 2004). One way to understand this is to return to Fichte who claimed to have overcome the divide Kant introduced between the self and the world by showing that when the subject (I as thinking) grasps itself as an object for itself (I as thought), it is simultaneously grasping the world of which this object is a part. While Novalis thought that this was still a mediated reality, with the I as thought like the image in the mirror, for Schelling ([1800] 1978) what was more interesting was to think that when the subject reaches for the object, the object simultaneously reaches for the subject, and in so far as the human is in nature, a foundational romantic maxim, then in this mutual attraction of subject to object, of the thinking I to the I as thought, we find also the movement of nature as thinking to nature as thought. Therefore it must be possible to provide both an idealist account of the emergence of self-consciousness and a materialist account of nature's movement toward greater self-organization and complexity in thought. Thus there is an isomorphism between self and nature, an identity, which is neither radically different from Kant nor the same as Fichte.

In "River Life and the Upspring of Nature," I explore these philosophical insights through two distinct trajectories. Along one trajectory I understand Schelling to be claiming that nature is the grounds on which selfhood and culture is pitched. Thus in one chapter I explore how we might understand this by showing how a community of farmers living on moving lands express the imperatives that make them pack up and move when the lands are breaking and how often they cannot give any explanations as to why they did what they did other than to say that they had observed other animals and objects doing the same when caught in the swirl of the water. This is, I claim, the aspect of their entrainment by the river waters, which isn't at the level of cognition but is at the level of aesthetic experience and ordinary expression. In another chapter, I show how the eruption of the mythic into everyday life is also the eruption of nature and its changes into consciousness. Along a second trajectory, I am interested not to apply Schelling's insights to the lives of my interlocutors but rather to see how his thinking springs from within his moment and milieu and how my interlocutors' reflection on their lives springs from their particularity and how they speak to one another. I am particularly interested to explore how an anthropologist, abiding with both texts and people as my companions, understands the convergences and divergences between them, in particular, their concerns

and exigencies, while always keeping my present with the shadow of catastrophic environmental change in view. How can returning to Kant via Schelling and others provide a way to not simply cast the past in self-imposed ignorant villainy but to understand how the struggle to know oneself and to know oneself in nature were once and even now lively and important issues?

Anthropologist Ute Eickelkamp (2017), who studies the Anangu living on the eastern part of Australia's Western Desert, also utilizes Schelling's perspectives on nature. The differences from my perspective are illuminating in drawing out the capaciousness of the German romantic tradition for anthropology. Both Eickelkamp and I find Schelling's perspectives on nature very promising. For Schelling, nature is the unconditioned ground for mind and matter, as a consequence of which one tends toward the other (in a manner similar to the I as subject and object, as thinking and thought in Fichte). For me, working with Muslim itinerant farmers on the shifting sands of the Brahmaputra for whom monism is anathema, such a relationship can only be understood in terms of difference yet identity, expressed in the way in which the farmers relate to their lands as separate from yet extensions of themselves. But for Eickelkamp working with the Anangu given to something akin to monism, Schelling's perspectives read as "nature shares the structure of subjectivity" (2017, 237). Schelling may be read as saying both because he expresses indebtedness to Kant for whom the separation is necessary and to Spinoza for whom the separation is only apparent (Förster 2012; Nassar 2014). The difference may be a matter of the reader's emphasis or how much fidelity the reader places in Schelling's intellectual chronology, as according to Schelling's trajectory monism is followed by identity philosophy.

Be that as it may, in contrast to my bringing Schelling and the farmers into conversation through me, for Eickelkamp, Schelling serves to draw out and sharpen the specificity of Anangu's relationship to nature. It is worthwhile following the contours of her arguments as she attends to the complexity of both philosophies while comparing them. In describing the Anangu's contemporary situation, Eickelkamp highlights how they are converting to Christianity. However, she does not find there to be wholesale transition from a totemic mode of thinking to naturalism as if "by default." In fact, she argues, "the encounter [between Anangu philosophy and Christianity] produces points of tension that can lead to the renewal of a monistic ontology—as indeed occurred in Western thought" (2017, 243). She is in effect using Schelling as an example of the fact that Kant's Copernican Revolution did not only create a two-world ontology for all times but also had the obverse effect of causing the efflorescence of monistic ontology in romantics, such as Schelling. She understands Schelling as saying "on account of its organicity, that is, as a force not confined to mechanical laws, nature is self generative and hence both subject and object—creator and created" (2017, 243). Later, however, she clarifies that although Anangu subscribed to a relationship between the self and nature, their notions of nature as imbued by intentionality is not quite the impersonality or indifference of nature within Schelling. This makes a difference in the way the spirit is seen to imbue nature that comes to be concentrated in and actualized by the resurrection of Christ among the Anangu. Thus, in this elegant article Eickelkamp shows how Schelling's romanticism is important with respect to the wider Kantian tradition; how, through comparison, he helps to draw out Anangu notions of nature, but, at the same time, we see how he is still specific to his time and place and not easily transported. In a final comparison

between Eickelkamp and myself, the difference between the two hinges on the fact that for me it is possible to bring the Bangladeshi farmers and Schelling into conversation such that each is reanimated by the encounter.

The previous two instances of Kantian-influenced romanticism (Novalis and Schelling) provided ways to think about companionate relations between philosophy and anthropology, of opening up considerations of love tinged by skepticism between anthropology and its interlocutors, and opening anthropology to new ways to think of humans within nature and as nature. They open up the isolation of the Kantian subject, simply responding to sense impressions from the world and categorical imperatives from within themselves, to being with others (be it as other consciousnesses, concepts, modes of inquiry, or nature).

There is a second, better-known line of influence of German romanticism upon anthropology. Along this line, romanticism is considered both a threat and a promise. In "Inside the Romanticist Episteme" (1997), Thomas Blom Hansen criticizes scholarship in which the West is rendered as a homogenous entity and modernity treated as a coherent phenomenon against which to contrast and celebrate the partiality yet authenticity of subaltern voices within anticolonial and postcolonial criticism. He calls the latter a romantic episteme on which he writes: "the romanticist episteme marks in a certain way the final breakthrough of modernity as a cultural system, as it for the first time posits *originality* and notions of *autonomy* and *self-grounding* of human beings, cultures and social forms as marks of the highest cultural and political value" (1997, 23, emphasis in the original). Further on he writes, "The romanticist celebrations of the self-grounded and irreducible expression of human creative have been (in innumerable guises) the constant critical companion of positivist, materialist, teleological and other universalist schemes" (1997, 23). And in speaking of subaltern history and postcolonial criticism, he writes, "current debates always-already are posited upon the tension between these two epistemes, or, rather, mutually reproducing discursive fields whose recurrent intermixtures and re-differentiations remain a crucial intellectual deep structure of modern Western thought" (1997, 23). In other words, anticolonial and postcolonial scholarship only stands to reproduce the very structures of domination that it seeks to undo. It is from this critical position that anthropology is often chastised for being overly romantic (treated as a word of censor), willy-nilly celebrating difference without appreciating the fact that the difference may well be the product of power and not its undoing.

The article by Maite Maskens and Ruy Blanes titled "Don Quixote's Choice: A Manifesto for a Romanticist Anthropology" (2013) is a rejoinder to the critical position represented by Hansen and a re-extension of the promise of romanticism. Along this line of inheriting romanticism within anthropology, it is celebrated precisely for its focus on the creativity of the individual in revolt against the strictures of state and society. However, in an interesting fillip of the usual attribution of romanticism, anthropology doesn't romanticize its objects of inquiry; it is inherently romantic. Or more specifically, the anthropologist is romantic. Whereas Susan Sontag criticized the anthropologist as hero model within the writings of Lévi-Strauss, Maskens and Blanes suggest embracing this archetype. They write: "we identify the 'drive' as a consequence of a certain romanticist sensibility and propose that anthropologists need not be afraid of the inherent doubt that characterizes our discipline, taking advantage of that romanticist drive and oppositional stances as subversions, ways of combating internally and externally imposed hegemonies, fashions, and obligations" (2013, 246).

As such, the anthropologist is "guided by his or her own solipsistic convictions" and is drawn to "marginalities and ambiguous objects" among their many romantic tendencies. Among these the authors focus on anthropology's interest in "love" or rather non-utilitarian relations and exchanges, their emphasis on ethnographic fieldwork as a mode of disorienting and producing openness to difference, and their political commitments. Within the first theme of that of love, they attend to anthropologists such as Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, Gregory Bateson, and Erving Goffman, rounding out the list of anthropologists experimenting with existentialism, phenomenology, and sensorial experience with Michael Jackson, Paul Stoller, and Michael Taussig among others. Lévi-Strauss remains the paradigmatic figure within the archetype of the anthropologist as hero or one who romanticizes ethnographic fieldwork, whereas Marshall Sahlins, David Graeber, and James Scott are celebrated for undertaking "militant subversions" through their research and writing. As these figures feature heavily within a nonconformist streak within a nonconformist discipline, they are cited to draw out the breadth of the romantic drive that Maskens and Blanes attempt in their article.

There are interesting echoes between Maskens and Blanes's celebration of the romanticist drive within anthropology and Brandel's exploration of the possible space of conviviality between early romantics and anthropology through their mutual interest in taking seriously the affects, aesthetics, and politics that run through the anthropological enterprise. This would suggest that one could very well come to romanticism without the mediation of Kant as in the case of the first strand of romanticism explored. However, there is much that is lost or troublesome without the grounding provided by Kant. Maskens and Blanes take the figure of Don Quixote as their ultimate expression of the romanticist hero/anthropologist who is driven by their solipsistic convictions. However, although according to Kant we cannot access the world in itself, we also cannot assume that the world is not there, as implied by the attribution of solipsism to the anthropologist. As Cavell writes, to do so is not only to deny the existence of the world alongside oneself but also possibly to consign it to extinction (Cavell 2004). We have to assume that everything that we think and feel is produced by the impress of the world upon us. Furthermore, although Maskens and Blanes assumes romanticism's commitments as anthropology's own, Brandel takes more care to parse out the space between them as one of mutual exploration and engagement so as not to arrogate one for the sake of the other as in the case of Kant's philosophical anthropology. Without Kant it is as if anything can be said of romanticism.

Be that as it may, Maskens and Blanes's singular contribution is to remind the early 21st century that romanticism is historically inherited by anthropology and to recall George Stocking's important edited book on the topic titled *Romantic Motives: Essays on Anthropological Sensibility* (1989). In the introduction to his book, Stocking informs us that this interest in romanticism was spurred by his present, the late 20th century, in which the book was published, which saw the rise of reflexive anthropology with its interest in an interpretive, hermeneutic approach to the study and analysis of cultures. These provide the two important themes that run through the book, the intellectual history of the various strands of romanticism that came to be claimed by anthropology and the historical moments when anthropology turned to its romantic inheritance, drive, or sensibility, suggesting that the turn was invariably inspired by tumult and revolt against its present. Of these, two chapters in particular draw out the historical inheritance of romanticism within anthropology.

Gregory Schrempp's "Aristotle's Other Self: On the Boundless Subject of Anthropological Discourse" (1989) shows how important Aristotle has been to the Kantian project and through Kant to Durkheim and Franz Boas. In particular, he shows how Kant's use of the categories drew upon and recast Aristotle's list of categories and how both Durkheim and Boas presumed the a priori and universal nature of such categories even as they approached the study of societies and cultures and their concepts in their historical and environmental specificity. This orientation to the categories was an outgrowth of their efforts to place social science on the same footing as natural science. Interestingly, the link to Aristotle meant that anthropology also inherited his more spiritual bent that strained against the bounds of reason and natural science. In drawing out Durkheim's and Mauss's reliance upon Aristotle for the mysterious grounds of friendship or other non-self-interested associations, Schrempp writes: "Aristotle might generally be regarded as ancestral totem for those forms of social science discourse that rest upon a seeming logical deviance—for example, the mystical part of Mauss—for those characterizations of society that, whether found in any indigenous representations or among social science theories, involve formulas that are 'rebellious to intelligibility'" (1989, 37).

In "Speakers of Being: Romantic Refusion and Cultural Anthropology" (1989), Thomas De Zengotita claims Rousseau and Herder as the forefathers of cultural anthropology and shows their influence on anthropologists, such as Sapir and Lévi-Strauss. While the connection of Herder to anthropology is parsed out with great care by Zammito in his *Kant, Herder, and The Birth of Anthropology*, it suffices to draw out this connection for an alternate route between romanticism to anthropology. First Zengotita notes Rousseau's struggles to disentangle and understand language, reason and society as constituent elements in the prehistory of his present. He writes, "what Rousseau experienced as defeat, a developed Romantic tradition would one day affirm, and language, thought, and society would be united as indissoluble aspects of humanity's being, as a reunion of the moral and the mental with nature—indeed, as *a* nature, and eventually, as the anthropological concept of culture" (1989, 83).

Writing about Herder, Zengotita notes that he avoids the problem of the divide between the world in itself and the world as appearances presumed by Kant by insisting on the aspect of language as sound. "The foundation of Herder's linguistics was the natural position of sound in the phenomenological sensorium. Hearing was the 'central and unifying sense' of humanity. Through it, other senses became 'language-apt' and men became 'creatures of language'" (1989, 91). Sounds and their reciprocation brought humans together in the world without a divide between them. In addition to his insistence of the uniqueness of language for socializing man, Herder also introduced the notion of "folk genius" within anthropology: "In Herder's mind, genetic power met Montesquieu's climate and yielded a world-spanning variety of 'folk genius'—with 'genius' understood as a way of life, a manifold of weather-settings, subsistence modes, myths, values, customs, and sensibilities . . ." (1989, 3). Zammito and Vermeulen characterize this understanding of folk genius as the foundation for the culture concept and the ethnological method upheld by Boas. George Stocking's edited volume *Volkgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthropological Tradition* (1996) secures that claim. Vermeulen tracks how ethnography and ethnology emerged along two separate lines of inquiry only to merge under the rubric of sociocultural anthropology, while Stocking's edited volume tracks the 18th- and 19th-century German milieu that produced Boas, and Boas's early education and self-training to become an anthropologist in the early 20th century.

Franz Boas's short essays "The Aims of Ethnology" (1940) and "The Study of Geography" ([1887] 1996) help round out the second more studied route by which romanticism has been absorbed within anthropology. They show how Boas did not just inherit and transmit romanticism through his French and German predecessors, but that he brought renewed focus to an aspect of romanticism that gets overshadowed when the focus is either on its commitment to complete Kant's project by exploring the possibility of knowledge of the whole, or its commitment to transgress the bounds of reason in pursuit of creative and solipsistic individualism. In "The Aims of Ethnology," Boas spells out the process by which one is to produce histories of peoples without written records. In order to do so, one has to make "a study of the total range of phenomena of social life" (1940, 627). Further on he writes, "every living being is [to be] considered as the result of an historical development. The fate of an individual does not influence himself alone, but also all the succeeding generations" (1940, 633). In other words, the individual is part of a series constituting the social, a whole in terms of historical development and a beginning. In "The Study of Geography," Boas is even more explicit in his interest in a mode of thinking that does not make individual objects the means to excavate the underlying logics and laws of the world but that treats each object as a world unto itself.

While one reading of Boas may take this to express his interest in cultures as organic wholes, another way to understand him is as carrying forward the romantic interest in the fragment. The fragment brings together the two lines of romanticism to anthropology that I have been tracking, through Kant as mediated by German romantics and through the romantics alone. In *Literary Absolute* (1988), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy have explored how the German romantics positioned the fragment as an important means to get beyond the Kantian settlement but also the binaries and polarities proposed by early romantic thinking. Several quotes from them should suffice to suggest the promise of this genre for the romantics: "the fragment as a determinate and deliberate statement, assuming or transfiguring the accidental and involuntary aspects of fragmentation" (1988, 41). Just as the deliberate and the accidental, and the spontaneous and the necessary are yoked in this quotation, so is the part to the whole in the following, "It is thus identically the plural totality of fragments, which does not make up a whole (in, say, a mathematical mode) but replicates the whole, the fragmentary itself, in each fragment" (1988, 44). But the fragment, as we see from Boas, also carries forward Rousseau and Herder's commitment to singularity, be it of the human, language, folk genius, culture, or of the individual.

Thus although a Kantian-inflected romanticism opens up anthropology to problems that have become newly important for the early 21st century concerned with our coexistence with others and with nature, a more varied, unruly, even decontextualized appreciation of romanticism also yields tremendous riches for anthropology past and present. The fragment remains one of the most enduring elements within contemporary anthropological writings and suggests the deep embedding of romanticism, with or without Kant, within anthropology (see Brandel and Bagaria 2019; Das 2007). As always, anthropology provides its own twist on the genre of the fragment. Writing about the fragment in her book *Life and Words* (2007), Das says, "Unlike a sketch that may be executed on a different scale from the final picture on draws, or that may lack all the details of the picture but still contain the imagination of the world, the *fragment* marks the impossibility of such an imagination. Instead fragments allude

to a particular way of inhabiting the world, say, in a gesture of mourning" (5, emphasis in the original). In contrast to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's exposition, Das's intervention deepens the ambivalence within the fragment with respect to the world.

In "Plotting the Field: Fragments and Narrative in Malinowski's Stories of the Baloma" (2019), Andrew Brandel and Swayam Bagaria explore the methodological promise of the fragment. They explore how while Malinowski's polished essay on the baloma treats the ritual as elaborating the principle of matrilineal descent within the Trobriand Islands, the fragmentary mentions of the baloma within Malinowski's field notes and diary, those that clearly resisted assimilation into the narrative pursued in his essay, speak to the manner in which inchoate thoughts of death randomly seized the anthropologist showing, in the words of the authors, "no thought is ever available to us in all its intensity, but rather catches and takes hold of us unevenly" (2019, 15). In summarizing the value of this perspective for anthropology, they write: "Anthropological theory often treats the fragmentary stories we encounter, and that we tell, mereologically – as parts of wholes to which we can possibly have access. To speak of unfinished stories, however, is to consider that such fragments might *not* abide imaginations of an external wholeness – a potentially finished story with a definitive end. Rather snatches of experience remain open to being picked up in new contexts with new intensities" (2019, 19, emphasis in the original).

These words may be productively extended here, which has been to explore actual, possible, and potential relations between Kant and anthropology within the early 21st century without providing a "finished story with a definitive end" (Brandel and Bagaria 2019, 19). Within the realm of actual relations, classical figures within anthropology (Durkheim, Mauss, Lévi-Strauss) took up Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason* to understand the nature of thinking and morality within so-called primitive societies. They sought to put society before mind within Kant's architectonic of thought and to posit classification, or relational thinking, as equally important as cognition. Within possible relations, contemporary anthropologists (Rabinow, Fischer, Asad) engaged Kant's anthropology or Kant as a possible anthropologist in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* or "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" or set apart their enterprise of studying ethics (Laidlaw, Das, Lambek, Robbins) from his on morality. A very central question that Kant's writings posed for them was whether the figure of the human was knowable, to which they added their own nuance by asking whether we can assume it is the same human or reason across all contexts. Within potential relations, writings on the history and method of anthropology (Hansen, Maskens and Blanes, Stocking, Schrempp, Zengotita, Boas) both critiqued and celebrated the inheritance of German romanticism, understood as an intellectual trend, a methodology, a sensibility, a mystical orientation, a celebration of individual singularity and genius, within anthropology. We asked whether a more Kantian-inflected understanding of the romantic movement (Brandel, Khan, Eickelkamp), mediated by different figures (Novalis, Schelling as opposed to Rousseau and Herder), could also be a productive point of entry for anthropology into understanding the philosophical underpinnings of its preferred methods (e.g., fieldwork), its engagement with philosophy beyond that of agonism and possible arrogation, and its re-engagement with the question of the human in relation to itself, other humans and nonhumans, and in nature. We ended by suggesting that the fragment, one of romanticism's greatest creations and complex responses to Kant's two world metaphysics, appears to anthropology through both trajectories and, in keeping with

anthropology's evolving relation to philosophy, tracked through Kant, it provides its own spin on the importance of the fragment for inhabiting the world and our intellectual legacies and archives.

Further Reading

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